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CRIMINOLOGY AS A FORCE FOR HUMAN TOLERANCE
Harold E. Pepinsky
Indiana University, Bloomington
ABSTRACT
Criminology traditionally has been the
study of twin forms of intolerance--crime and
punishment. Punishment can only increase
crime. Criminology ought to become a study
of how to alleviate crime and punishment by
engineering tolerance of greater varieties of
human behavior, where "social control" takes
on positive connations. A framework is
outlined for making criminology a force for
human tolerance.
When national spirits are low as now in my
country, crime is fearsome and war or its
onset palpable. Spirits become low as it
becomes apparent that national appetites are
unsatisfied. Within a society, the problems
may range from children dying of hunger to
chieftains ordering death and destruction
because palace vaults remain unfilled. While
it is tempting to point fingers at villains
to punish for national disspirit, and while
the hungry children deserve more sympathy
than chieftains whose thirst for power is
unquenchable, the only cure for a national
disease like ours is one that satisfies human
appetites throughout society. Unless paths
to power can be so directed that wealth moves
toward the poor and the food moves to hungry
children, even the chieftains risk a
premature violent end.
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Crime and punishment, then, are among many
symptoms of a national meanness of spirit--of
a disease of the central nervous system of a
people that drives the people to victimize
one another in the name of survival of the
body politic.
Among our people today is a group who call
themselves criminologists. Criminologists are
those whose livelihood rests on the promise
they offer of contributing to a prescription
to relieve the symptoms of crime and
punishment. The position of criminologist
during national disspirit is both established
and marginal. It is solid because people are
willing to pay a lot to be able to victimize
(or punish) offenders before the offenders
victimize them. It is vulnerable because
those at the top of the political order feel
so vulnerable to collapse of the order
itself. Criminologists whose work implies
prescribing political reordering by extension
question rulers' prerogatives, and question
imprisonment and execution of dissolute poor
young men. On the surface, they side with
devils against national heroes and saviors.
If not allied with the devil, if on the
political side of the angels, the work of the
criminologists must confirm the possibility
that punishing poor young men can be a just
and effective cure for crime. This
constraint has the same effect as limiting
medicine to treating hemophilia to the
science of using bandaids for treatment.
When patients keep dying because internal
bleeding is ignored, suspicion can be
expected to rise that the doctors do not know
what they are doing. Promising young doctors
stand to be cast as buffoons or quacks before
their careers end. Some of these
criminologists rise to wealth and prominence
for a period. During this period, they may
gain the sanctuary of sinecures at prominent
institutions. But people soon stop expecting
to learn anything new from them about crime
or its control.
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While few criminologist understand our
marginality, all of us soon feel it. Whether
we side with the devil or doom ourselves to
ineffectuality, we are driven to form
alliances against the form of marginality we
encounter. Often, our safest targets turn
out to be other criminologists. Our
alliances take the form of declared
allegiance to schools of criminology. The
banners of these alliances carry many names,
from the general to the esoteric, from the
impersonal to the personal: such names as
"science, .. empirical,' ".critical,"
"ethnomethodological," "Marxist," and
"humanist." Battles fought under these
banners are largely a waste of lives of
criminologists, who apart from secret signs
and rituals among members have little sense
of what about crime they are fighting to
establish or vanquish. On the other hand,
generally subconsciously, school members
share basic religious assumptions about how
crime can be understood and treated, about
the origins of sin and redemption. Among
those who assume that conformity to political
authority is both natural and necessary,
sinners are those who depart from reason and
virtue, and redemption lies in supporting the
forces of law and order. As Weber (1958,
originally 1904-5) describes it, Calvinism is
the purest expression of this religious
premise. Offenders are born to be damned and
those in a state of grace are born to
maintain discipline among the damned.
Discipline may range from lobotomies to
sterilization to incarceration to education
to positive peer pressure. At any rate, this
kind of criminologist is called to help us
understand how to do unto offenders before
they do unto us.
Those who call themselves humanists have
rejected religions that absolve some of the
sins of others. As a corollary, victims and
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their allies cannot be redeemed without
redeeming offenders. This religion is called
"humanism" because it acknowledges no higher
purpose to the life of each of us than to
improve the lot of the meanest, least
successful people among us. Each of us who
lives among badness shares responsibility for
failure to give wrongdoers enough power to do
good and justice to others. In a nutshell,
our redemption lies in giving killers and
thieves power to profit more from saving
lives and sharing wealth. Means to
redemption must be just and beneficial in
themselves, since humanists reject knowledge
that destructive or hurtful means can be
revealed to have served good ends in some
future day of judgment. Human beings can do
no better than to pass judgment on their own
actions here and now, and to presume that
another's offenses represent a failure of
one's own social imagination in practice.
Ultimately, sin in others is a mark of one's
own social inadequacy, and deserves to be
dealt with as such.
So it is that humanist criminologists
presume their choice of calling to lie in
their own hands. No practical reality of
earning a livelihood can justify to a
humanist overlooking an immediate
responsibility to address how to reduce crime
by changing the political order shared by
offenders and victims. It is axiomatic to
the humanist that crime is caused by a
political disease that infects the entire
society and everyone in it. Crime is
presumed somehow to be caused by a tacit
agreement of a society's members to reward
sin rather than redemption by good works.
Humanists, therefore, characteristically
engage in critical analyses of social reward
and property structures. They assume that
crime occurs because virtue does not pay big
enough dividends, and ask how pay scales
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might be adjusted to reward virtue, so that
the rich get richer faster the more quickly
they arrange for the poor to catch up with
them, in sum as rich and poor redeem one
another. Humanists presume that a gap
between rich and poor impoverishes most the
spirit of the rich--that the appetite for
redemption takes precedence over all others,
so that the appetite of those who rise
highest above others in power is the appetite
for power that is least sated. As compassion
in action, the redemption of the
criminologist that entails improvement of the
material lot of the poor also entails
improvement of the spiritual and impoverished
intellectual lot of the rich.
This article falls within the humanist
tradition. It addresses the issue of what
kind of impoverishment of holders of economic
power impoverishes those denied economic
power, and in the process exacerbates crime
and punishment. Crime and punishment to this
humanist criminologist are what law and order
are to a Calvinist criminologist: I assume
you cannot have more of one without having
more of the other. Punishment is an
inextricable part of the forces that produce
crime, and the solution must somehow entail a
new system of rewards. The question that
confronts me as a humanist criminologist
boils down to this: How can people be freed
from having to engage in the business of
crime and punishment?
THEORY AND PRACTICE
This article is unabashedly theoretical.
It has become commonplace to figure that
theory is by definition impractical and
unempirical. Nothing could be further from
the truth. In any science, a theory is
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simply a way of explaining the mistakes
people have experienced (that is, doing an
empirical analysis) that implies odds-on bets
as to how to avoid similar mistakes in future
experiments (that is, being practical).
According to the theory derived here, it is
the height of impracticality to invest in
more police and prisons in the hope that
crime will be conquered. And yet, implicit
in the finding that punishment just makes
crime worse is the possibility of a
prescription for success at reducing crime
and making our streets safe to walk.
According to the theory, new forms of
government investment in American enterprise
can be hypothesized to free us from crime.
In recognition that being practical requires
a theory of how to achieve success, I cannot
as I write rest content to let facts about
crime and punishment speak for themselves.
FREEDOM THROUGH SOCIAL CONTROL
One should engineer for variety.
-- Les Wilkins, 1975
We study social control.
-- Vic Streib, 1977
When Les Wilkins made his assertion in a
class on philosophical issues of law and
social control we taught, I argued that he
was contradicting himself. When Vic Streib
made his assertion (see Streib, 1977) during
faculty discussions of how to rename our
Department (almost everyone having agreed
that "Forensic Studies" needed changing), I
dissented vehemently. I have since learned
that I was wrong on both counts. I credit
Les and Vic--both trained as engineers--with
forcing a major insight on me.
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I am a criminologist who wants to learn how
to make my society freer from crime,
violence, predation and fear. I am inclined
toward seeking ways to free us from crime by
giving citizens greater liberty to control
their own destinies. Engineer and social
control connote restriction of personal
liberty, and I have therefore been
predisposed to resist them. But wait.
Perhaps Les and Vic have a point. Perhaps
there are organized ways to expand personal
liberty, and perhaps this kind of
organization offers paths to crime control.
If so, the business of the criminologist who
seeks to free people, as from crime, may well
be to design and test plans for engineering
social control. Social control can connote
shared control of personal destiny; social
control can bestow power on citizens and set
them free.
In this article, I hope to show how to
distinguish repressive social control from
liberating social control. I shall try to
show that criminology has largely been a
science of repressive social control, but
that it need not remain so. Indeed, if our
knowledge of crime is to help us achieve
greater freedom from crime, our science will
have to be one of liberating social control.
Ours will have to become a force for human
tolerance.
CONSTRAINING METHOD TO FREE SUBSTANCE
We must learn to accommodate variety.
-- Les Wilkins, n.d.
Les Wilkins's starting point for analyzing
crime and criminal justice is information
theory (as in Wilkins, 1974). It is a useful
starting point to put ideas ahead of material
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conoitions. As Les also argues, it is
useless to ask whether a model is "true" or
"real." The issue ought instead to be whether
a model "works," whether application of the
model helps us to do things we otherwise
could not conceive or evaluate. Granted,
material conditions--as reflected in the
class structure--must be changed before
Americans can become freer of crime. Granted
that material circumstances shape much of our
thinking. Still, as Marx for instance
recognized in his early writing, if people
are to break free of material circumstance
and change their social world, someone must
first break free of material constraints on
thinking enough to conceive a critique of the
present and a plan for the future. If we
criminologists, especially those of us who
enjoy the relative freedom of tenured faculty
status, cannot break free to think
independently of material circumstance, we
might as well give up on having others break
through to something like a true class
consciousness. Material conditions are no
excuse for us to fail to try thinking freely,
independently, radically. This is the
underlying premise of an information systems
model that challenges us to think about how
variety can be accommodated. The model
implies that we must first conceive how to
think less unjustly, more tolerantly, to
generate hypotheses about what changes from
present material circumstance might improve,
or at other times or places have improved,
our social lot.
Wilkins (1964) has most thoroughly
described his model as one of "deviance
amplification." Whatever norms of behavior,
appearance or status members of a society
impose, whatever system or model we impose to
describe or prescribe behavior, some
behavior, appearances or statuses will lie
outside the system. Any definition of
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conformity implies the existence of
deviance--of inexplicable departures from the
norm. No model of information can account
for all cases. We are then left with what
Les Wilkins portrays as a crucial choice. We
can reject or ignore or try to suppress the
deviance, or we can learn from it and
incorporate what we have learned into a new
model. As he stresses, this is not merely an
academic issue; it has profound practical
implications.
He cites auto theft as an example. We
invent cars, and create registration systems
to maintain an order of car ownership, hence
of car usage. Lo and behold, no matter how
hard we try to perfect the system, some
people use or steal cars without the owners'
permission. The more resources we put into
the creation of cars and car ownership, the
more defiance of norms of ownership we
encounter. In fact, auto theft rises in
direct proportion to the number of cars we
put on the roads. We have two options as to
how to respond to this deviance.
We can persist in using our model. We can
persist in the belief that the more force and
resources we put into perfecting and
protecting a system of owner registration,
the more conformity will prevail over
deviance.
Or we can presume that the rise of auto
theft throws the model of ownership and
registration into question. We can recognize
that expanded auto registration and
enforcement in fact creates auto theft. We
can recognize that the more determined our
efforts to regulate car usage, the greater
the variety of arrangements we create to
confound our system. For instance, when we
succeed in stamping the serial number of a
car indelibly on the engine block and body,
and ensure that the police will check the
number before anyone can take out
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registration, we create chop shops to take
parts off the engine block and body, and
encourage the growth of a market in stolen
parts. This drives up the overall price of
transferring stolen cars or parts, and
requires that more conspirators--including
insurance agents--be corrupted into
deviance. Auto theft--the deviance--expands
to confound our model of control of car
ownership.
The better option, then, is to change our
model--our definition--of the problem of
controlling access to transport. We might,
for example, project that the more readily
and cheaply available public transport
became, the less people would care to invest
in private autos, and the fewer cases of
stolen autos we would encounter. Notice that
when the model changes, not only our means of
addressing the problem changes, but so does
our very definition of the problem (from car
usage to transport). Our new model proposes
to explain not only what the former model
proposed to explain (orderly auto usage), but
the deviance (auto theft) or confounding of
the old model. The new model implies that
auto theft is lawful and normative. It
accommodates auto theft as conformity to a
system of transport, and poses an alternative
to creating this normative problem. The
message: If you cannot fight auto theft, join
it and make the force underlying auto theft
work for you. Or: You cannot stamp out
deviance, but perhaps you can include it in
future plans.
It is no accident that engineers like
Streib and Wilkins are inclined to think this
way. They know that you cannot beat
structural weakness into submission. If too
much weight is put on a beam, a bridge will
collapse no matter how hard you beat on the
manufacturer of the beam. Better to redesign
the bridae. to allow for the tolerance to
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stress of beams and other components.
Engineers are trained to redesign systems to
accommodate deviance from the best-laid
plans.
Consider now the basic structural flaw
confronted by criminologists.
demonstrates that for periods not
History
exceeding
one generation, political revolutions like
that in China in 1949 can direct law
enforcement toward corruption by officials
and by persons of wealth. But in the longer
run, our model of the crime problem produces
a consistent, persistent problem in any
society with chronic unemployment: Young,
male members of the underclass--the
chronically unemployed group--will threaten
the breakdown of law and order. The more we
try to punish and confine this "dangerous
class," the worse the crime problem gets, and
the more people fear to walk the streets of
their communities. This model assumes that
crime is inextricably linked to poverty.
Either poverty itself causes crime, or
something like bad genes that cause crime
also cause poverty. Within the model, then,
the poor must be beaten, cajoled or
encouraged into submission to societal norms
in order to free us from crime.
It is time to recognize that the model will
not work. Its use will not free us from
crime, and indeed its use dooms us to crime.
If we cannot succeed by fighting the poor, we
had better join them to fight whatever it is
that keeps them poor and deviant. Our new
model had better accommodate the poor, and
assume that they are as normal as the rest of
us. This indeed was the tenor of the work of
a number of prominent Depression-era
criminologists, such as Robison (1936),
Sellin (1938), Sutherland (1940), and
Tannenbaum (1938). But we criminologists
largely fell back to our old model in the
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wake of World War II, and here most of us
remain to this day.
Fortunately, criminologists at the fringes
of the profession (commonly known as
"radical" or "critical" criminologists) have
been laying the foundation for a new model of
crime that accommodates the poor. Within the
model, crime and punishment are treated as an
inherently political game--a game of power.
Those who have the greater power will be more
inclined to victimize others, and greater
license to victimize without paying a
penalty. Thus, it is wealth and the power
that goes with it, not poverty, that is the
chief cause of crime. There is a wealth of
corroborative evidence for this proposition.
For instance, doctors alone unlawfully kill
and steal far more than all street criminals
combined (see, e.g., Sutherland, 1949;
Reiman, 1984; Pepinsky and Jesilow, 1985).
Even if nine out of ten police officers were
assigned to patrol corporate and professional
suites instead of the streets, (a) perhaps
more unlawful harm would be detected and
curtailed than at present, but still, (b)
rich offenders would be less likely than poor
to be caught and punished, since in most
cases, it is hard even to detect that rich
offenders have victimized anyone.
By this model, wars on crime cannot be won
basically because they ignore the heart of
the crime problem. They teach that might is
right. They teach that poverty, or failure
to get ahead by fair or foul means as
circumstances permit, is a sin. Wars on
crime teach people that naught but a thin
blue line keeps at bay those who would take
their television sets, their money, their
paychecks, their dignity, their health or
their very lives for profit. In a vicious
circle, they teach that the Golden Rule is
naive--that the real world requires one to do
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unto others before they do unto oneself.
These wars emerge when the babies of foreign
or other civil wars reach adolescence, in
post-war economies where too much money is
chasing too few goods and too little
employment in a cycle we have come to call
"stagflation." General anxiety that
livelihood and general support, respect and
comfort are lacking becomes focused on a
tangible, relatively powerless scapegoat--the
poorest of the adolescent men in the
society. (Women in these political cultures
more than share the burden. While law
enforcement toys with the men in the streets,
women are charged with bearing and raising
the next generation of men and of women to
tend their homes.) The force with which
suppression of the unemployed is pursued, to
the exclusion of employment of the citizenry,
only heightens popular insecurity. Prison
populations swell to record heights, which
serves only to fuel the general insecurity
and fear of crime. This phenomenon has
recurred for centuries (Melossi and Pavarini,
1981); today's Fourth American War on Crime
is especially violent and frightening
(Pepinsky and Jesilow, 1985).
Wars on crime are one of many forms that
failure to accommodate variety takes. During
these wars, parents tend to hate and fear
spontaneity in their children. So while
prisons, training schools and death rows are
set aside for young men, parents work to
create the atmosphere of prisons in their
homes (Pogrebin, 1983; Aries, 1962). For the
past century, and especially during wars on
crime, concerted efforts have also been made
to keep children in schools for most of their
waking hours, where as now, discipline and
suppression of youthful energy are stressed
over inquiry and intellectual growth
(Collins, 1979). Intolerance of variety at
home has its counterpart in foreign
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relations, where stronger nations aim to
suppress weaker peoples (Tuchman, 1984).
Whatever the rhetoric (as in advocacy of
"socialism," 
.national socialism," "free
markets," "liberalism," "conservatismin, "
"demand economies, " "supply-side economics, "
or "protectionism"), government intervenes on
the side of preserving the power and
prerogatives of the wealthiest and biggest
entrepreneurs, rather than encouraging
reinvestment in new systems of production.
From the bedroom to the nursery to the
streets to the schools to the workplace to
the boardrooms and halls of government, the
norm is to try to hold the line--to resist
deviation from established models of exchange
and instruction, notably by blaming the poor
and the young for threatening established
prerogatives of rich elders. In this climate
of intolerance, lines are redrawn to cast
larger proportions of outliers as ungrateful,
irascible deviants. Or as Wilkins puts it,
deviance is amplified, as determination not
to accommodate deviance grows.
What would accommodation of variety
entail? Jesilow (1982a; 1982b), for one
among today's criminologists, gets straignt
to the heart of the matter. He asks that we
look back to Beccaria (1968; originally 1764)
and Smith (1937; originally 1776) for key
insights. Both these thinkers were
preoccupied with how to structure the
political economy to promote the general
welfare. Both assumed that government needed
to be so structured as to constrain the
citizenry to be productive rather than
destructive. Taken together, they analyzed
the yin (Beccaria's deterrence of crime) and
yang (Smith's "invisible hand" promoting the
greatest good for the greatest number) of the
political universe. Read the two works
carefully, and it becomes apparent that what
deterrence requires for Beccaria is
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essentially what Smith requires for the
invisible hand to operate. Each thinker
recognizes that destructive forces cannot be
blocked by the wrong form of government.
Despots and oligarchs cannot achieve peace
and prosperity for the general public.
Beccaria notes that repressive punishment
does not deter crime. The public has to see
that a captain of industry who steals a
million dollars is as likely to lose a
million-and-one dollars to the state as a
mugger who steals ten dollars is to lose
$10.01. Deterrence requires class-blind,
restrained punishment; otherwise, punishment
becomes a spectacle that invites rather than
discourages crime. But Beccaria glosses over
the hard question of how to make the state
class-blind. Smith does not.
Smith recognizes that no market can be
free, nor justice evenhanded, when government
allows any economic enterprise to become too
large and free of personal control. Instead,
the governments of his time actually
intervened to build oligopolies. A prime
intervention was to issue charters of
incorporation. These charters absolved
investors (owners) from personal liability
for the conduct of business affairs. Thus,
investors could risk joining together as
irresponsible strangers, and the large pools
of capital that resulted could dominate
markets with no one in particular being
responsible for the conduct of corporate
affairs. Alternatively, where incorporation
were precluded, each entrepreneur would have
to stake all personal assets on keeping the
business honest, lawful and responsive to
consumers. Even wealthy brothers would think
twice about trusting all to a partnership
that the partner might betray, or from
incurring too much liability in a single
enterprise. So, without this government
intervention, enterprises would be
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constrained to remain small. Each
entrepreneur would be loath to trust personal
wealth to strange suppliers and customers,
and so markets would tend to be localized.
Meanwhile, there was no reason to expect
demand to be any smaller in such a free
market than it would be under oligopolies,
and so in place of small numbers of large
producers, one would expect large numbers of
small producers. Given the stake in adapting
to market conditions that came with personal
liability of entrepreneurs, and given that
small enterprises are more manageable and
easier to change than large ones, small
enterprises would adapt to changing markets
faster than large corporations. Small
enterprises would be deterred from defrauding
or cheating customers; they could not afford
it, and local customers would detect fraud
and dishonesty faster than strange, distant
customers. When the state tried to enforce
honest compliance with contracts, when it
sought to punish white-collar criminals, the
relative powerlessness and vulnerability of
relatively equal small enterprises would
facilitate evenhanded justice. And since
entry into a market of small businesses is
easier and cheaper than entry into a market
dominated by large corporations, those who
sought work could more easily create it for
themselves; the underclass would dwindle, and
with it crime and punishment. Smith's utopia
was much like Marx's, where ownership of the
means of production was as widely spread as
possible among the general populace. It
coincides with Schumacher's (1975) premise
that "small is beautiful," that the scale of
technology must be kept small enough for
little groups of workers to afford it and to
shape it to the forces of supply and demand.
Indeed, Smith's initial prototype of the
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successful enterprise is a needle factory
employing three workers. To read Smith
carefully is to wonder whether he is turning
over in his grave at how economists like
Milton Friedman pervert his ideas.
Smith's liberal economy is designed
precisely to accommodate variety. Within a
free market, he aims to maximize the variety
of production systems, of worker methods and
skills utilized, of products themselves, and
of consumer preferences satisfied. Where, as
here, variety is the norm, it becomes pretty
hard to isolate idiosyncratic producers and
consumers as deviant. And the scale of
economic dislocation and conflict is kept
small. If a typical three-person enterprise
in Podunk goes under because it loses its
market, that hardly presents the occasion for
a major police crackdown on the newly swelled
ranks of the unemployed. Because of the
variety of producers, the failure of one
scarcely entails the failure of many others.
Nor will this be the occasion for a
representative government to go to war, as
when a threat to Anaconda Copper and ATT
occasions our government's complicity in a
military coup in a place like Chile. Since no
producer has the wealth or power to do much
damage even by determined fraud and
criminality, the state has no call to impose
heavy sanctions to deter crime. Hence,
Smith's political and economic order is
designed to permit the state to deter as
Beccaria advocates. In sum, variety in the
substance of production entails peace,
deterrence, and relative justice.
As political scientist Elinor Ostrom has
urged upon me, it is equally important to
recognize that every variety entails a
corollary rigidity. This goes to the heart
of the seeming paradox posed by Streib and
Wilkins. The methods delineated by Beccaria
and Smith for achieving peace, justice and
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general prosperity could hardly tighter. Put
another way, when Wilkins calls for
developing models to accommodate variety, he
is advocating logically tight, carefully
specified models for achieving the
objective. The need to specify a method for
encouraging personal variety should be quite
familiar to us in the U.S.; it is enshrined
in our Constitutional history. Like Adam
Smith, the framers of our Constitution
recognized that unconstrained government
invited despotism. But as Tocqueville (1945,
originally 1840: vol. 2, 336-39) recognized,
the American Constitution and the values it
represents invite a kind of despotism, in
which people concede political responsibility
to an oligarchy of state and economic
leaders, indeed the very kind of oligarchy
that Adam Smith criticized. So the question
remains: How can a government be constrained
to accommodate variety?
There is nothing wrong with what our
Constitution contains. The problem lies in
what it omits: principles of government
investment. As Smith helps demonstrate,
governments like ours invest heavily in the
economy; even the most conservative
government shapes the market by its patterns
of investment. Not only do state governments
ratify corporate charters. Some 30% of our
workforce are literally government
employees. A quarter of our gross national
income is manifestly, directly expended by
the national government for defense. Large
corporate enterprise is subsidized via tax
law, as by investment credits and
depreciation allowances which favor
enterprises with the largest revenues.
Federal Reserve policies are designed
primarily to guard the profitability of the
largest corporate banks, which in turn favor
the largest corporate and national
borrowers. So to argue that American
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governments engage in principled investment
in our economy is not to advocate a change
from non-involvement to government
intervention; it is instead to argue that
principles of intervention be changed. One
shortcoming of Smith's analysis is that it
assumes social processes to be reversible;
the analysis assumes that a government which
has intervened in the economy can simply back
out. Darwin (1968, originally 1859)
established the basic fact that life
processes, from embryonic development to
species survival, move forward with no
turning back (Bateson, 1980). We have reached
the stage at which government control is
vital to moving the economy toward Smith's
dreams. If governments were to withdraw
subsidies from big business, such as defense
contracts, investment credits, depreciation
allowances and tax abatements, how would they
reinvest?
The constitution of a British enterprise,
the Scott Bader Commonwealth as described by
Schumacher (1975: 274-92), provides sound
guidelines for investment:
First, the firm shall remain an
undertaking of limited size, so
that every person in it can embrace
it in his mind and imagination. It
shall not grow beyond 350 persons
or thereabouts. If circumstances
appear to demand growth beyond this
limit, they shall be met by helping
to set up new, fully independent
units organised along the lines of
the Scott Bader Commonwealth.
Second, remuneration for work
within the organisation shall not
vary, as between the lowest paid
ant the highest paid, irrespective
of age, sex, function or
experience, beyond a range of 1:7,
594
before tax.
Third, as the members of the
Commonwealth are partners and not
employees, they cannot be dismissed
by their co-partners for any reason
other than gross personal
misconduct. They can, of course,
leave voluntarily at any time,
giving due notice.
Fourth, the Board of Directors of
the firm, Scott Bader Co. Ltd.,
shall be fully accountable to the
Commonwealth. Under the rules laid
down in the Constitution, the
Commonwealth has the right and duty
to confirm or withdraw the
appointment of directors and also
to agree to their levels of
remuneration.
Fifth, not more than forty per
cent of the net profits of Scott
Bader Co. Ltd. shall be
appropriated by the Commonwealth--a
minimum of sixty per cent being
retained for taxation and for
self-finance [e.g., capital
investment] within Scott Bader Co.
Ltd.--and the Commonwealth shall
devote one-half of the appropriated
profits to the payment of bonuses
to those working within the
operating company and the other
half to charitable purposes outside
the Scott Bader organisation.
And finally, none of the products
of Scott Bader Co. Ltd. shall be
sold to customers who are known to
use them for war-related purposes.
Schumacher goes on to report on this
manufacturer of sophisticated petroleum
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distillates:
When Mr. Ernest Bader and his
colleagues introduced these
revolutionary changes, it was
freely predicted that a firm
operating on this basis could not
possibly survive. In fact, it went
from strength to strength, although
difficulties, even crises and
setbacks, were by no means absent.
In the highly competitive setting
within which the firm is operating,
it has, between 1951 and 1971,
increased its sales from 625,000 to
5 million pounds; net profits have
grown from 72,000 to nearly 300,000
pounds a year; total staff has
increased from 161 to 379; bonuses
amounting to over 150,000 pounds
(over the twenty-year period) have
been distributed to the staff, and
an equal amount has been donated by
the Commonwealth to charitable
purposes outside; and several new
firms have been set up.
(Schumacher, 1975: 276-77)
In an American context, where the scale of
production has grown bigger than in Britain,
we might have to accommodate the difference
by encouraging the development of larger
enterprises than Scott Bader. This would be
especially so in using abandoned plants like
steel or auto assembly factories. Here,
where several thousand workers might be
needed to use existing capital, we need not
require that the plant stay closed because
its workforce would so far exceed Scott Bader
limits. Otherwise, the Scott Bader model
ought to be as appropriate to American as to
British circumstance.
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Note that Scott Bader does not seek to
revert to pre-corporate times; it uses laws
of incorporation and shapes them to a new
purpose--to provide guarantees to its workers
and to its community. Its constitution sets
minimal, basic restrictions on size,
ownership, management and purpose of the
enterprise.
I suggest that Smith and Beccaria's
objectives might be approached if governments
were to limit their investment to businesses
that constituted themselves like the Scott
Bader Commonwealth. There need be few
restrictions on corporate purpose. Would-be
entrepreneurs ought instead to be encouraged
to invent all manner of products and services
to meet local needs. For services like those
of law and medicine, subsidies could take the
form of special government insurance coverage
of clients. Indeed, the enterprise of this
kind that provided the lowest-cost service
could be used as the standard by which limits
on insurance coverage were set. The
government could also reserve consulting
services--for problems of management,
marketing, training and accounting--for such
enterprises.
Thus constrained, government investment
would foster variety in production and
consumption. It would encourage enterprises
to commit themselves to long-term planning
and to community welfare. While the variance
in products and services, and in consumer
preferences, within and among markets, should
be increased if the model works as projected,
the variance in indices of method should
narrow. Two such indices of method are
employment (level and average length of
unemployment should decline as regular
employment becomes the norm) and income
disparity (both among corporations and among
individuals, which should also decline).
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Variance in cost of living over time should
also decline, under a model that favored
long-term investment over short-term
profit-taking. Because the failure of any
enterprise would cause minimal economic
dislocation, and because re-entry into the
market for displaced workers would be eased,
bail-outs like those of Chrysler would not be
needed. If the model worked, businesses
would be rewarded for honesty toward their
workers, suppliers and customers, and so the
major crime problem--that of white-collar
crime--should decline. The underclass should
shrink, and so reported crime and punishment
should also decline. As the variance in
income among citizens declined, so, too,
should severity and disparity of criminal
justice sanctions. In sum, the model
predicts that economic forces would combine
to diminish and accommodate deviance rather
than amplifying it. (This is essentially a
summary of the argument laid out in Pepinsky
and Jesilow, 1985.)
CONCLUSION
Social control and social engineering need
not restrict human opportunity. Properly
modeled, they can increase and vary
opportunity, and in the process, reduce
levels of injustice, crime, and war.
Since World War II, timidity has dominated
American criminology. This is only natural
for criminologists who had been confronted
with bold, broad and penetrating critiques by
Depression-era colleagues, but who were
unwilling to forsake traditional models of
crime and punishment. Until criminologists
abandon the premise that poverty is
unavoidably linked to crime, and that crime
can only be controlled by restricting
behavior most characteristic of underclass
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young men, ours is bound to be a science of
intolerance. We are bound to assume that
crime is a departure from middle- or
upper-class values, and to limit solutions to
the problem to strategies for restricting
variance from success within the dominant
political and economic system.
If, then, traditional criminology produces
practical knowledge of crime and its control,
it must by definition aid repression and
restriction of forms of human endeavor.
Consciously or unconsciously, I think this
reality is recognized by all of today's
criminologists. At the same time, many of us
are committed to empowering and helping
rather than hurting and restricting those we
study. Within the traditional model, our
good will drives us to restrict the scope of
our science, as to problems of "the middle
range," and to what we assert are apolitical
or value-neutral questions (Pepinsky, 1980:
190-93). Indeed, as I have heard many a
colleague argue, it is dangerous to do
grander work within traditional models. But
middle-range, value-neutral work is no
solution to the problem. In the aggregate,
such works perpetuate, legitimize and foster
the growth of repressive crime control. It
is the models themselves that turn good-faith
efforts to bad ends.
Above all, criminology is the study of
human intolerance. We study how criminals
fail to tolerate what is precious to their
victims, and how victims and would-be allies
fail to tolerate offenders. The corollary is
that crime and punishment decline only as
tolerance of people, and of their control of
their own destiny, increases--where people
choose not to restrict others' exercise of
freedom to be and do differently by
victimizing or punishing them for deviance
from their own life patterns. Very few
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criminologists (Christie, 1981, being one
outstanding exception) even try to find what
makes tolerance possible. If the models
change, insofar as criminologists become
scientists of human tolerance, they can in
good conscience become avowedly and grandly
political in building and testing theories of
crime and its control. We have a strong
classical tradition to build this effort upon
in works of scholars like Cesare Beccaria and
Adam Smith. We have in fact a highly
developed body of empirically based and
tested theory from which to proceed, once it
is recognized that the work of scholars like
Adam Smith and E. F. Schumacher belongs in
our field. As here, paradigm shift is never
easy not because the new paradigm is
unproven, but because of the political and
psychological investment all scientists tend
to have in asking traditional questions
(Kuhn, 1974). There is a way for the
criminological community to build knowledge
that enables Americans and others to free
themselves from crime. Whether there is a
will remains to be seen.
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